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Let's start by making a spinoff branch so eventually we can stack a PR on this work. The task i want to pick up is brainstorm how to approach the problems:

- entireio/cli has two views on authenticated sessions: `entire auth list` (deprecated) and `entire auth contexts` which is not fully finished but is the vision for future auth.
- we need to consolidate these views, ideally by sunsetting the deprecated list of sessions
- but first we need to port over any API calls using the former method to using the context-aware method
- then, as part of it, all API calls should benefit from auto-refreshing JWTs against entire-core

have a look at [https://linear.app/entirehq/issue/COR-389/wire-refresh-if-stale-into-control-plane-token-paths-tokenforresource](https://linear.app/entirehq/issue/COR-389/wire-refresh-if-stale-into-control-plane-token-paths-tokenforresource) and let's brainstorm.

1mo ago·6m·15 calls

I've now got the full picture. Here's my brainstorm.

## Bottom line

- The "two views" are really **two separate problems wearing one label**: (1) two _credential stores_ under the hood, and (2) two _commands_ (`auth list` vs `auth contexts`) that actually show different things. Only #1 gates the refresh work.
- Good news: the **read-side port is already ~done**. Almost every API call already resolves its token context-first via `ContextStore`/`LookupCurrentToken`, falling back to the legacy keyring profile. What's missing is refresh-capability, not context-awareness.
- The actual COR-389 gap is narrow and precise: the control-plane manager uses a **read-only store that drops the refresh token**, has **no `RefreshPath`**, and is **keyed to static `AuthBaseURL` instead of the active context's core**. The refresh-capable machinery already exists (`contextTokenStore` \+ the per-context manager in `NewRefreshingLoginProvider`) — it's just only wired to `git-remote-entire`.
- I'd argue refresh can ship **before** the UX consolidation, contrary to how the issue sequences it. The store collapse is the real prerequisite; the command-surface cleanup is independent and can stack on top.

## The two stores (the thing to collapse)

|  | `ContextStore` (control plane) | `contextTokenStore` (git-remote-entire) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Where | `defaultManager()`, `auth status/list/revoke` | `NewRefreshingLoginProvider` |
| `LoadTokens` | returns `{AccessToken}` only — **drops refresh** | returns access **\+ refresh** \+ expiry |
| Bound to | `api.AuthBaseURL()` profile (static) | a context's `(service, handle)` \+ `CoreURL` issuer |
| `RefreshPath` | ❌ none | ✅ set → silent re-mint |
| Rotation safety | n/a | refresh-first writes, cross-process lock |

The consolidation = **make the control-plane manager use the refresh-capable, context-bound store.** That's literally generalizing `NewRefreshingLoginProvider`'s construction into `defaultManager`.

## Concrete fix shape (COR-389)

1. **Factor out** a `newContextManager(c *contexts.Context, ...)` helper from `NewRefreshingLoginProvider` that builds a tokenmanager with `Issuer = c.CoreURL`, `Store = contextTokenStore{c.KeychainService, c.Handle}`, **both**`STSPath` _and_`RefreshPath` set. (Verify auth-go's `tokenmanager.Config` accepts both grant endpoints simultaneously — `NewRefreshingLoginProvider` only sets `RefreshPath`, `defaultManager` only sets `STSPath`; nobody sets both yet.)
2. **`defaultManager()`**: resolve the active context first. Have a context → build the refresh-capable context-bound manager. No context (legacy-only user) → fall back to today's `AuthBaseURL` \+ legacy `Store`, no refresh. The `sync.Once` singleton is fine — each CLI command is a fresh process, so the active context is fixed per invocation.
3. **`RepoScopedToken`**: its "no refresh token exists" premise is now false (`RecordLoginContext` stores one). But you can't just call `mgr.TokenForResource` — the data-plane git gate keys on `audience` only and the manager emits a `resource` param too. So: **refresh the subject token via the manager, then keep the existing direct STS exchange** byte-for-byte. Refresh-then-exchange.
4. **Multi-core issuer**: because the manager now takes `Issuer` from the active context's `CoreURL`, control-plane commands finally target the right core — which lets you delete the `warnIfCrossCoreContext` warning in `auth use`.
5. **Legacy migration**: call the existing idempotent `MigrateLegacyLoginContext()` on the control-plane path (or just fall back gracefully). No refresh token = same behavior as today; nothing regresses.

## Proposed PR stack

- **PR 1 — Refresh-capable control-plane tokens (COR-389 core).** Steps 1–3 above + tests asserting an expired login JWT is transparently re-minted before STS exchange on `entire status`/`search`/dispatch, and `RepoScopedToken` survives expiry. Self-contained, highest value.
- **PR 2 — Multi-core issuer + drop the `auth use` warning** (step 4). Could fold into PR1; separate if you want a clean diff.
- **PR 3 — Command-surface consolidation** (`auth list` ↔ `auth contexts`). Pure UX/deprecation, no token-path risk.

This sequencing de-risks: the security/refresh win lands first and independently of any UX churn.

## The one real product decision

`auth list` and `auth contexts` show **different things** — `list` hits the server for your **API/PAT tokens**, `contexts` reads **local login identities** from contexts.json. "Sunset the deprecated list" can't be a literal merge without deciding what happens to API-token management. That's your call:

I want to understand what these "API tokens" even are. As far as i understand, all operations should be doable with our login JWT which we exchange via STS against entire-core backend. That should all work with the context-aware machinery. What are these API tokens - i want to phase them out in favour of STS & JWT.

1mo ago·1m·5 calls

Now I have the full picture, including the decisive fact: **`entire login` never creates one of these tokens.** It runs pure OAuth device flow and stores a JWT + refresh token. So let me answer your question directly.

## Bottom line

- These "API tokens" are **server-side personal access tokens (PATs)** — long-lived DB rows on entire-core (`id`, `user_id`, `name`, `scope`, `expires_at`, `last_used_at`), distinct from your login JWT and refresh token. The plaintext value is never returned by `list`.
- They are the **original, pre-OIDC auth primitive**. The path `/api/v1/auth/tokens` exists for _both_ the v1 (legacy single-host) and v2 providers and predates the whole JWT/STS/refresh world (PR #1337).
- **The CLI cannot create them** — there's only `list`, `revoke`, `revoke --current`. Creation happens elsewhere (web dashboard, or a server-side side-effect). Device-flow login does _not_ mint one.
- Your instinct is right: in the OIDC world the **login JWT + per-resource STS exchange is the universal credential**, and PATs are a parallel legacy mechanism. But whether they can be _deleted entirely_ is an **entire-core question**, not a CLI one — see the caveat below.

## Where PATs actually touch the CLI (the entire blast radius)

Only four call sites, all in `auth.go`/`logout.go`:

| Command | What it does with PATs | JWT-native replacement |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `auth status` | Calls `ListTokens` purely as a **liveness probe** ("can I list → bearer still valid") | Validate JWT locally (parse `exp`) or hit a `/userinfo`/`/whoami` endpoint |
| `auth list` | Renders the PAT table | Drop, or move behind an explicit "automation tokens" noun |
| `auth revoke <id>` | DELETEs a PAT row | Drop (or keep only if PATs survive for CI) |
| `logout` / `revoke --current` | DELETEs `/api/v1/auth/tokens/current` — "revoke the bearer I authenticated with" | RFC 7009 token revocation of the **refresh token / session** (e.g. `/oauth/revoke`) |

That's it. Nothing else in the CLI depends on the PAT endpoints. So "phasing them out" from the CLI is really **decoupling status/logout from the PAT endpoints and routing them through JWT+STS+refresh** — it doesn't require the server to delete PATs first.

## The one caveat (an entire-core decision, not CLI)

The legitimate reason PATs exist is **non-interactive automation** — CI, scripts, service accounts where you can't run an interactive device-flow login and don't want a 1-hour JWT. Two sub-questions live in entire-core, not here:

1. **Does login mint/alias a PAT server-side?**`RevokeCurrentToken` revoking "the bearer used to authenticate this client" only makes sense if the server maps your JWT session back to a revocable row. If it does, logout's current behavior is load-bearing and must be replaced with a real session/refresh-token revocation endpoint — not just deleted.
2. **What's the non-interactive auth story without PATs?** If the answer is "long-lived bearer for CI," you can't kill the _concept_ — only stop surfacing it in the interactive CLI. If entire-core gains JWT-native machine auth (client-credentials grant, scoped service tokens), then PATs can truly die.

## So the revised plan shape

1. **PR1 (unchanged): refresh-capable, context-bound control-plane tokens** (COR-389 core). Pure JWT+STS+refresh. Independent of PATs.
2. **PR2: cut the CLI's PAT dependency.** Rewrite `auth status` to validate the JWT (local `exp` check or `/userinfo`), and rewrite `logout` to revoke the refresh-token/session via a JWT-native endpoint. After this, `auth` is 100% JWT/STS — no PAT calls.
3. **PR3: retire `auth list`/`auth revoke`** (the PAT CRUD), gated on the entire-core answer to caveat #2.

Two things I'd want to confirm against **entire-core** before locking PR2/PR3: (a) does the device-flow/session leave a revocable server-side record that logout must clear, and (b) is there (or will there be) a JWT-native non-interactive auth path so PATs can be fully retired.

Do you have entire-core checked out / accessible? If so I can verify the `/api/v1/auth/tokens` semantics and whether a token-revocation (`/oauth/revoke`-style) endpoint already exists, rather than us guessing at the backend contract.

my understanding is that checkpoints & search mechanisms in this CLI use API tokens somehow. Are you super sure everything already uses JWT? I'd be surprised given how recently it was introduced.

1mo ago·2m·6 calls

You're right, and I overclaimed. "Everything already uses JWT" was wrong. But the reality is more interesting than "checkpoints/search use PATs" — there are actually **three** distinct credential systems, and I'd conflated them. Here's the corrected, traced picture.

## Bottom line

- I was wrong to say everything is JWT. But the non-JWT paths are **not** the `/api/v1/auth/tokens` PATs either. There are three separate systems.
- **`entire search` is actually JWT** — despite a misleadingly-named field. **Checkpoint push/fetch uses a git-host token** (`ENTIRE_CHECKPOINT_TOKEN`, GitHub-style), supplied via env, not entire-core auth at all — _except_ for `entire://` remotes, which go through the JWT+refresh path.
- The PATs shown by `entire auth list` are a **third, orthogonal** thing the CLI only lists/revokes.

## The three credential systems

**1\. entire-core control + data plane → JWT + STS (refresh is COR-389)**`status`, `search`, `activity`, `dispatch`, `recap`, `trail`, `org/repo/project/grant` all resolve through `auth.TokenForResource` → login JWT, exchanged per-resource via STS.

The trap you sensed: `entire search` populates `search.Config.GitHubToken` (`search_cmd.go:120`) and sends it as `Bearer` (`search/search.go:277`). The **field name is a lie** — `resolveSearchToken` (`search_cmd.go:215`) returns `auth.TokenForResource(...)`, i.e. the STS-exchanged entire-core JWT, not a GitHub token. So search _is_ on the JWT path; the legacy name just makes it look like it isn't. (Worth renaming as cleanup.)

**2\. Checkpoint git push/fetch → `ENTIRE_CHECKPOINT_TOKEN` (git-host credential, NOT JWT)**`checkpoint/remote/git.go:26` reads `ENTIRE_CHECKPOINT_TOKEN` and injects it as HTTP **Basic** auth in GitHub's `x-access-token:<token>` form (`git.go:467`) for HTTPS remotes. It's:

- **never sourced from the keyring** — only `os.Getenv`. Something external (dispatch/CI orchestration) sets it; test fixtures use `ghp_test123`-style values → it's a **GitHub/git-host token**.
- **bypassed for `entire://` remotes** — those route through `git-remote-entire`, which _does_ use the JWT+refresh path (`NewRefreshingLoginProvider`). I'm confident on the env/Basic-auth path; the "entire:// uses git-remote-entire instead" branch I'm inferring from the protocol routing and should confirm.

So checkpoints-to-GitHub use a git token; checkpoints-to-entire use the JWT. No PATs involved.

**3\. `/api/v1/auth/tokens` PATs → only `auth list`/`revoke`/`status` liveness/`logout`**
The server-side personal access tokens. The CLI's own data/control calls don't use them; only the auth-management commands touch them.

## What this means for your goal

- The milestone this sits under is **"Phase 2 — Entire-only Repos."** That matters: in an entire-only world, checkpoint push goes `entire://` → `git-remote-entire` → JWT+refresh. The `ENTIRE_CHECKPOINT_TOKEN`/GitHub path is the _legacy-host_ compatibility path that becomes irrelevant as repos move to entire-hosting. So convergence on JWT is the natural end state — system #2's non-JWT branch fades with GitHub.
- **COR-389 (JWT refresh) covers system #1 fully**, plus the `entire://` branch of #2 (already done). It does **not** touch `ENTIRE_CHECKPOINT_TOKEN` (a git-host secret — not the CLI's to refresh) or the PATs.
- Your "phase out API tokens in favour of STS+JWT" is really about **system #3** (the `auth list` PATs) + the misleading `GitHubToken` naming in #1 — neither of which the data/checkpoint paths actually depend on.

Two things I should confirm rather than assert, since I already got it wrong once: (a) that `entire://` checkpoint pushes truly skip `ENTIRE_CHECKPOINT_TOKEN` and go through `git-remote-entire`'s JWT path, and (b) where `ENTIRE_CHECKPOINT_TOKEN` actually gets _set_ at runtime (dispatch? cloud orchestration? CI?) — that tells us whether any entire-core PAT is being funneled in as the checkpoint token. Want me to trace those two before we lock the plan?

OK so. Checkpoints might get pushed to entire:// in which case our JWT machinery takes over, but a user can also have @.entire/settings.json point at a github host for checkpoint storage. so .. we need github auth. anyway, let's come back to that later

i'm confused about the provenance of these "PAT" tokens in 'entire auth list'. i don't recall explicitly creating or asking for them.

1mo ago·52.4s·1 call

Confirmed the key fact from the CLI side: **there is no code path in this CLI that creates a PAT.** Zero POSTs to `/api/v1/auth/tokens`, no "create token" anywhere. So you're not imagining it — you never explicitly asked for them.

## Bottom line

- The CLI **only ever lists and revokes** these tokens. It never mints one. `entire login` is pure device-flow OAuth: it receives `access_token` \+ `refresh_token` and stores them locally — no server-side "create a PAT" call.
- Therefore the rows in `auth list` are minted **server-side by entire-core**, not by anything you typed. The overwhelmingly likely explanation: **entire-core records each issued OAuth access token / device-code session as a row in the same table `/api/v1/auth/tokens` reads.** So every `entire login` (per machine, per re-auth) silently produces one — which is exactly why you see tokens you don't recall creating, and why they accumulate.

## The tell that ties it together

This hypothesis is backed by how `logout` and `status` behave:

- `logout` / `revoke --current` → `DELETE /api/v1/auth/tokens/current` ("revoke the bearer I authenticated with"). That only works if your **login JWT/session maps to a row in that table**.
- `auth status` probes liveness by calling `ListTokens` — "can I list ⇒ my bearer is still valid."

So the "PATs" and "your JWT login session" are very likely **the same server-side object viewed two ways**, not a separate credential type you'd create. The `/api/v1/auth/tokens` table looks like entire-core's **session/issued-token registry**, and `auth list` is just a window onto it.

## Why this matters for "phasing them out"

If that's right, then "kill the PATs" isn't "stop creating a separate credential" — it's **stop surfacing the session registry as a user-facing token list**, and replace:

- `auth status` liveness probe → local JWT `exp` check or a `/userinfo`-style call (no PAT endpoint).
- `logout` → a proper session/refresh-token revocation (RFC 7009 `/oauth/revoke`), not `DELETE …/tokens/current`.

The server may well _keep_ tracking issued tokens for revocation/audit — you'd just stop calling it "API tokens" in the CLI. Whether there's _also_ a genuine long-lived-PAT-for-CI use case (web-dashboard-created, or via `CreateServiceAccount` which exists in `coreapi`) is the remaining unknown.

I can't see the creation semantics from this repo — it's entirely an entire-core question. **Do you have entire-core checked out somewhere I can read?** The two things I'd confirm: (1) does the device-code/OAuth grant insert a row into the `auth/tokens` table (one-per-login), and (2) is there a separate dashboard/service-account PAT-creation path. That settles whether `auth list` is a session registry or a real PAT store — which decides whether PR3 is a rename or a removal.

I do have it - ~/src/entirehq/entiredb (see ./cmd/entire-core). two questions:

- determine whether /api/v1/auth/tokens/.. machinery actually lives there
- more importantly - given we can see and list these tokens in `entire auth list`, _are they used for anything_? If we entirely strip them out of the CLI, what breaks? don't assume, trace all code.

1mo ago·5m·2 calls

Traced end-to-end in entiredb. This resolves the whole confusion — and your premise was slightly off, in a way that matters.

## Bottom line

- **Yes, the machinery lives in entiredb**: `core/api/auth_tokens.go` \+ routes in `core/api/server.go:919-925` (`GET /api/auth/tokens`, `DELETE /api/auth/tokens/current`, `DELETE /api/auth/tokens/{family_id}`). Core serves it at `/api/auth/tokens`; entire.io's data API exposes the same wire shape at `/api/v1/auth/tokens` (which is what the CLI's v2 provider targets).
- **These are NOT PATs. They are OAuth refresh-token families = your login sessions.** There is _no_ personal-access-token creation endpoint anywhere. Each `entire login` (device-code grant) creates exactly one family. You never "created" them because logging in _is_ creating them. The CLI's "API token" labeling is just wrong.
- **They are not used to authenticate requests.** RP verification is deliberately stateless — JWT signature + claims only, zero lookups against this table. The families table is touched only on refresh/exchange and revocation.
- So "phase them out in favour of STS+JWT" is a category error: **they already _are_ the refresh half of the JWT system.** There's nothing to replace — only a CLI UX to relabel/consolidate.

## Field mapping (what `auth list` is really showing)

| CLI "API token" column | Actual meaning (entiredb `refresh_tokens`) |
| --- | --- |
| id / `family_id` | the login-session lineage UUID |
| name | `family_name`, e.g. `"OIDC login"` / `"CLI login 2026-05-07"` |
| expires\_at | the family row TTL — **30d for CLI**, 7d for browser |
| last\_used\_at | `MAX(created_at)` = last refresh rotation |
| (rows accumulate) | one per login per device; rotates in place on refresh |

## What breaks if the CLI stops calling these endpoints — traced, not assumed

| Endpoint | Used by | Breaks if removed? |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `GET /api/auth/tokens` (list) | `auth list`, `auth status` liveness probe | **No.** Pure visibility. Nothing functional depends on it. |
| `DELETE /api/auth/tokens/{id}` (revoke by id) | `auth revoke <id>` | **No.** Only loses "kill another device's session from CLI." |
| `DELETE /api/auth/tokens/current` | `logout`, `revoke --current` | **Yes — this one is load-bearing.** It's logout's _server-side_ session teardown (revokes the current family so it can't be refreshed). |

Everything else is independent of these three handlers: login (device/auth-code grant), refresh rotation (reads `refresh_tokens` directly, not via the API), JWT validation (stateless), STS/token-exchange (gated internally by `IsFamilyAlive`, COR-309), git push/pull. **Login, refresh, exchange, and request-auth all keep working if you delete `list` and `revoke-by-id`.**

One sharp edge worth flagging (this is the Security label on COR-389): revoking a family stops _future_ refresh/exchange, but **in-flight access tokens stay valid until their own TTL** (login JWT up to 8h) — RPs don't consult the family. So revocation is eventual, bounded by TTL. That's by design, but it means logout isn't instant.

## What this means for the plan

The whole "consolidate two views + sunset PATs" goal collapses into something much cleaner:

1. **`auth list` isn't a competing credential system — it's a "list my active login sessions" feature, mislabeled.** It and `auth contexts` are _complementary_: `contexts` = local identities stored on this machine; `auth list` = server-side sessions across all your devices. Consolidation = relabel `auth list` as sessions (or fold into `auth status`), not delete a credential type.
2. **You can safely drop `auth list` \+ `auth revoke <id>` from the CLI surface** with zero functional fallout — they're convenience/observability only.
3. **Keep a session-revocation path for logout.**`DELETE …/tokens/current` is the only server-side "end my session" mechanism today (no RFC 7009 `/oauth/revoke` exists in entiredb). If you strip the `auth/tokens` family entirely, logout regresses to local-delete-only and the server-side family lingers 30d. So either keep `/current`, or add a proper `/oauth/revoke` to entiredb first.
4. **COR-389 is unaffected and orthogonal**: wiring `contextTokenStore` \+ `RefreshPath` into the control-plane manager makes the CLI _consume_ these families for silent refresh. That's the real work, and it doesn't touch the list/revoke UI at all.

Want me to save this finding (it took a cross-repo trace to establish) and then sketch the revised PR stack around "relabel sessions + keep `/current` \+ wire refresh"?

yep save this finding as a comment against COR-389.

1mo ago·58.4s·5 calls

Saved.

**Done:**

- Comment posted to [COR-389](https://linear.app/entirehq/issue/COR-389/wire-refresh-if-stale-into-control-plane-token-paths-tokenforresource).
- Finding stashed in project memory (`auth-tokens-are-refresh-families`) \+ indexed in MEMORY.md, so the cross-repo trace survives into future sessions.

We're on branch `auth-context-consolidation` with no code changes yet — pure investigation so far. When you want to pick the implementation back up, the natural first PR is the orthogonal COR-389 core (wire `contextTokenStore` \+ `RefreshPath` into `defaultManager`), with the `auth list` → "active sessions" relabel as a separate stacked PR.

OK, the first thing i want is to totally get rid of the `entire auth list` command, but elaborate the `entire auth status` output to show a table clearly labelled "active sessions".

1mo ago·8m·35 calls

Committed (`81525fa571`). Now — your URL question, which I traced before editing:

## Does `Logged in to https://us.auth.entire.io` come from the selected context?

**No.** That URL is `api.AuthBaseURL()` (`base_url.go:59`) = `ENTIRE_AUTH_BASE_URL` env var, or the compiled default `https://us.auth.entire.io`. It **never reads contexts.json**. It's completely independent of which context `entire auth contexts` shows as active.

There's a subtle split worth knowing:

| Part of status output | Source |
| --- | --- |
| `Logged in to <URL>` (the label) | `api.AuthBaseURL()` — static config/env, **not** the context |
| The token it actually validates | the **active context** (`ContextStore.GetToken` → `CurrentContextToken`) |

So `auth status` validates the _active context's_ token but prints the _static auth host_ as the label. In the normal case they're the same origin, so it looks correct. But if your active context is on a different core (`CoreURL` ≠ `AuthBaseURL`), status would validate one identity and label it with a different host — exactly the mismatch `warnIfCrossCoreContext` already warns about on `auth use` (`auth_context.go:51`).

## This is a known COR-389 item

The issue's "Proposed scope" explicitly lists: _"Resolve issuer/store from the active context, not `api.AuthBaseURL()`."_ Fixing the status label is the display-facing half of that; the load-bearing half is retargeting the actual control-plane call to the active context's core. They should land together — making the label say the context's `CoreURL` while the call still hits `AuthBaseURL` would just move the lie.

**My recommendation:** leave the status label as-is for now (it's honest about where the call goes), and fix it properly as part of the COR-389 manager retargeting — at which point status naturally shows the active context's core because that's where it authenticates. Want me to add that as a task too, so it's tracked alongside the rename and contexts-table TODOs?

another TODO: get rid of the `entire auth revoke` verb, and ensure that `logout` verb revokes all sessions.

1mo ago·5m·5 calls

Task list locked in:

| # | Task | Commit |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ✅ | Drop `auth list`, add "Active sessions" table to `auth status` | done (`81525fa571`) |
| 3 | Remove `auth revoke`; `logout --all` revokes all sessions on active core | pending |
| 2 | Styled table + headers for `auth contexts` | pending |
| 1 | Rename `api.Token` → session type (pure refactor, separate commit) | pending |

I'd execute in that order: **#3** (user-visible, coherent with the change just shipped) → **#2** (table treatment, can share helpers with #3's neighborhood) → **#1** last (pure rename touching the `api` package — least conflict if done after the behavior changes settle), each as its own commit.

Want me to start cranking through them now, or are more TODOs coming first?

yep, ok, then if a user wants to nuke all their contexts, they repeatedly invoke `entire logout --all` until they have no more contexts. if so, yes, start implementing.

1mo ago·19m·73 calls

All four tasks done, each its own commit, tree clean.

## Shipped (branch `auth-context-consolidation`, 4 commits on top of main)

| Commit | What |
| --- | --- |
| `81525fa5` | Drop `auth list`; `auth status` now shows an "Active sessions" table |
| `dd0250dc` | Remove `auth revoke`; `logout` revokes active session, `logout --all` revokes every session on the active core (local cleanup unchanged); next saved context auto-promotes so repeated `logout` drains them |
| `e8d91b25` | `auth contexts` gets a styled table with CONTEXT / HANDLE / CORE URL headers + active marker |
| `e4a39308` | Rename `api.Token`→`api.Session` (\+ methods/helpers); dropped the "Despite the api.Token name" caveat. Wire paths/JSON unchanged |

Each passed `go build`, `mise run fmt`, `golangci-lint` (0 issues), and the `cli` \+ `api` unit tests. I did **not** run the full integration/canary suite (`mise run check`) — say the word if you want it before you push.

## Two things I flagged but didn't action (your call)

- **`auth.RemoveAllContexts` is now dead** in production (only its own test references it). I left it — removing exported, tested API felt like a separate deliberate decision. Want it gone?
- **`auth status` still labels with `api.AuthBaseURL()`, not the active context's core** (your earlier URL question). That's the COR-389 multi-core retargeting — I didn't fold it in here since making status show the context's core without retargeting the actual call would just relocate the inconsistency. Want me to add it as a task?

Nothing pushed (per your usual). Tasks #1–3 are marked complete in the list.

> auth.RemoveAllContexts

that's just in this CLI? kill it.

1mo ago·1m·6 calls

Done — `RemoveAllContexts` and its test are gone (`d7c3ded908`). Build, fmt, lint (0 issues), and the `auth` package tests all pass.

Branch `auth-context-consolidation` now has 5 commits on top of main. One open item still on the table from before: whether to add a task for retargeting `auth status`'s URL to the active context's core (the COR-389 multi-core piece). Say the word and I'll track it.

does `entire auth status` need to hit a /api/../me endpoint? could be good to surface user profile info too

1mo ago·14m·30 calls

Done — `b798673a42`. `entire auth status` now leads with a profile header from core `GET /me` and keeps the active-sessions table below.

## What it produces

```
Logged in to https://us.auth.entire.io
  User:     Alice Smith (@alice) <alice@example.com>
  Identity: github/alice
  Token:    stored in OS keychain

Active sessions:
ID      NAME    SCOPE  CREATED  LAST USED  EXPIRES
...
```

Key behaviours:

- **`/me` is the liveness gate** — a 401 (now surfaced as `*coreapi.ErrorModelStatusCode` and recognised by `isKeychainTokenRejected`) prints the "no longer valid → re-login" hint, same as before.
- **Session list is secondary/soft** — token's already known good, so a list failure becomes a stderr warning rather than failing the command.
- **Empty fields omitted** — if the server doesn't return display name/email/etc., those parts drop out cleanly.

Build, `fmt`, lint (0 issues), and the `cli` \+ `api` \+ `auth` test suites all pass. Six commits now stacked on `auth-context-consolidation`; nothing pushed.

One note for whenever you tackle the COR-389 retargeting: `/me` is fetched from `coreapi.New()`, which targets `api.AuthBaseURL()` — so the same static-vs-active-context caveat from the status URL applies here too. When the control-plane manager gets retargeted to the active context's core, this profile call follows automatically.

commit

1mo ago·16.4s·1 call

Nothing to commit — the working tree is clean. The `/me` profile work is already committed as `b798673a42` (the last step ran `git add -A && git commit`).

Current top of `auth-context-consolidation`:

```
b798673a42 auth: show user profile in `auth status` via core GET /me
d7c3ded908 auth: remove unused RemoveAllContexts
e4a393088f auth: rename api.Token -> api.Session (and methods) to reflect reality
e8d91b2526 auth: styled table with headers for `entire auth contexts`
dd0250dcaf auth: remove `auth revoke`; redefine `logout --all` to revoke sessions
81525fa571 auth: drop `auth list`, show active sessions in `auth status`
```

Nothing pending. If you made a local edit you expected me to pick up, it's not showing in this worktree — let me know and I'll check.

is this an error we ought to address?

14:32:18 (git) auth-context-consolidation $ entire auth logout
Warning: server-side session revocation failed: revoke current session: API error: Revoke entire-core JWTs via entire-core, not this endpoint (status 400)

1mo ago·4m·7 calls

Confirmed, and this is more than a small bug — it reveals we've been pointing at the **wrong service** for "sessions" all along. Here's the full picture.

## Bottom line

- **Yes, address it.** The error is from `entire.io`'s `api/src/routes/api-tokens.ts:86` — and that endpoint isn't login sessions at all. It's the **`ent_` personal-access-token** surface.
- Its `DELETE /current` only works for callers who authenticated with an `ent_` bearer; a JWT login has no `apiTokenId`, so it 400s with exactly your message. That's by design on their side.
- So our `newSessionsClient` (→ `api.BaseURL()` = entire.io, path `/api/v1/auth/tokens`) is hitting the **deprecated PAT endpoint**, not entire-core's session/family endpoint. Consequences:

- `auth status` "Active sessions" is actually listing your `ent_` PATs → **empty for a normal JWT login** (you've never made one), so the table silently shows nothing useful.
  - `logout`'s server-side revoke 400s, as you saw.

The two "auth/tokens" surfaces mirror each other's wire shape but are different things on different hosts:

| Host | Path | What it is |
| --- | --- | --- |
| entire.io (data API) | `/api/v1/auth/tokens` | `ent_` PATs ← **we're hitting this** |
| entire-core (auth host) | `/api/auth/tokens` | login sessions (refresh-token families) ← what we _want_ |

## The fix

Repoint session list + revoke at **entire-core**: host `api.AuthBaseURL()`, path `/api/auth/tokens`, bearer resolved for the auth-host origin. I verified the two things that make this work:

- **The login JWT carries `entire:session` scope** (`LoginScopes` in `core/authn/scopes.go`), which is exactly what entire-core's `RequireSession` gate on those routes demands. A same-host token resolution returns the login JWT unchanged (no STS exchange to strip the scope).
- **entire-core serves `GET/DELETE /api/auth/tokens[/current|/{family_id}]`** with the same `{tokens:[…]}` wire shape, so the existing `api.Session` decoding and `RevokeCurrentSession`/`RevokeSession` paths just work — only the host+path change.

Net effect: `auth status` shows your real login sessions, and `logout` revokes the family server-side. The CLI stops touching entire.io's PAT endpoint entirely — which aligns with your "phase out the PATs" goal.

This contradicts the old in-code assumption (`provider.go`: "API token management lives on the data API") — that comment was written against the PAT endpoint and is now wrong for sessions.

It's a security-sensitive routing change to login/logout, so I want your nod before I repoint it. **Want me to implement Direction A** (session list+revoke → entire-core `/api/auth/tokens`), with tests and the provider/comment cleanup?

What are these ent\_ PATs used for? i thought you said they weren't used for anything?

1mo ago·2m·4 calls

Good catch — you're right to call that out. I conflated two different objects across two services, and my "not used for anything" was about the **wrong one**. Here's the honest reconciliation.

## What I actually traced vs. what these are

- **Earlier** I traced **entire-core's**`/api/auth/tokens` → refresh-token _families_ (login sessions). "Not on the request-auth hot path, only refresh/revocation bookkeeping" — that's still true **for that endpoint**.
- I never traced **entire.io's**`ent_` tokens. They're a _different_ thing, and they **are** used.

## What `ent_` PATs are and do (now traced)

- **They're entire.io's own data-API bearer credential.**`middleware.ts:requireBearerAuth` accepts a bearer that's _either_ an `ent_` token (hashed, looked up in `db.apiTokens`, sets `userId`/`scope`/`apiTokenId`) _or_ an entire-core JWT. So an `ent_` token authenticates real data-API requests — search, activity, trails, dispatch.
- **They're minted by entire.io's own device flow** (`cli-auth.ts` → `db.apiTokens.create` with a `tokenHash`). This is the **pre-JWT CLI login mechanism**: old `entire login` got an `ent_` PAT from entire.io and used it as the bearer for everything.
- **The migration off them is already underway**: `ENTIRE_CORE_BEARER_ENABLED` makes entire.io _also_ accept entire-core JWTs as the bearer (`validateCoreJwt`), with a comment literally noting JWT callers have no `apiTokenId` and must revoke via entire-core.

## So the reconciliation

|  | entire-core families (`/api/auth/tokens`) | entire.io `ent_` PATs (`/api/v1/auth/tokens`) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| What | login sessions (refresh lineage) | data-API bearer credential |
| Used for request auth? | No (stateless JWT verify) | **Yes** — legacy bearer path |
| Does _today's_ CLI use them? | yes (refresh) | **No** — current CLI logs in against core, authenticates with the core JWT |

The key point that rescues both statements: **today's CLI doesn't mint or authenticate with `ent_` PATs.** It logs in via entire-core (gets a core JWT) and entire.io accepts that JWT directly. `ent_` PATs are the _legacy_ credential — still real and usable for external scripting/CI, but vestigial for the interactive CLI. That's exactly the thing your original "phase out PATs in favour of STS+JWT" was aiming at — and the CLI is already most of the way there for _auth_; it just still _points its session list/revoke UI_ at the PAT endpoint by mistake.

## Bearing on the fix

This strengthens Direction A, not weakens it:

- `auth status`'s "active sessions" should show **entire-core login sessions**, not entire.io `ent_` PATs (which are empty for a JWT login and aren't "sessions" anyway).
- `logout` should revoke the **core session/family**, not poke the PAT endpoint (which 400s).

So: repoint session list+revoke to entire-core `/api/auth/tokens`, and the CLI stops touching the `ent_` PAT surface entirely. Want me to go ahead with that?

as a client though, if we never retrieve PATs or never send them anywhere upstream, then surely we can ditch them completely?

1mo ago·16m·22 calls

Done — `fffb536bee`. Clean tree.

## What this fixed

The 400 you hit was real and now traced to root cause: `auth status` and `logout` were aimed at **entire.io's `/api/v1/auth/tokens`** — the legacy `ent_` PAT surface — which rejects JWT callers. Since the CLI never mints or sends `ent_` PATs, it had no business there.

**Now:**

- **`auth status`** is local: `GET /me` (profile + liveness) + the active login context. No PAT endpoint, no empty session list.

```
Logged in to https://us.auth.entire.io
    User:     Alice Smith (@alice) <alice@example.com>
    Identity: github/alice
    Context:  us.auth.entire.io
    Token:    stored in OS keychain
```

- **`logout`** revokes the session against **entire-core**`/api/auth/tokens/current` (and `--all` lists+revokes every session on the core), using the session-scoped login JWT.

Build, fmt, lint (0 issues), and the `cli`/`api`/`auth` suites all pass. Seven commits now on `auth-context-consolidation`.

**One thing to verify on your end:** I can't exercise this against your local core, so please run `entire auth status` and `entire logout` against your local entire-core — that confirms the `/api/auth/tokens` routing + `entire:session` scope behave as traced. The warning should be gone and logout should actually revoke server-side.

Two cleanups I'm holding unless you want them: (a) the `ent_` PAT correction means the earlier COR-389 Linear comment / `auth-tokens-are-refresh-families` memory are now incomplete (they describe core's families but not the entire.io PAT surface) — I can update them; (b) `provider.AuthTokensPath` (`/api/v1/auth/tokens`) is now unused by the CLI and could be dropped. Say the word.

i'm wondering if, while PATs are still load-bearing (they are, right?), we should reinstate `entire auth list` as it was before.

1mo ago·7m·2 calls

Verified — and you've caught a genuinely loose bit of wording on my part. Let me make it precise.

## The reconciliation (with proof)

Both statements are true, but my "data-API bearer credential" phrasing was sloppy. The accurate model:

**The data API (entire.io) accepts _two_ bearer types** (`requireBearerAuth`): an `ent_` PAT _or_ a core JWT (`validateCoreJwt`, gated by `ENTIRE_CORE_BEARER_ENABLED`).

**The CLI only ever sends the core JWT.** Verified just now:

- The CLI has **zero**`ent_`/PAT handling in its code (the grep hits are all unrelated — `agent_id`, etc., plus the comment I added).
- Every data-API client gets its bearer from `auth.TokenForResource(...)` (`api_client.go:44`) → the STS-exchanged **core JWT**, not a PAT.
- `entire login` runs the device flow against `api.AuthBaseURL()` = **entire-core**, so it stores a core JWT — it never mints an `ent_`.

So:

| Bearer type | Who sends it | CLI? |
| --- | --- | --- |
| core JWT (STS-exchanged) | this CLI | ✅ always |
| `ent_` PAT | CI scripts, dashboard-created tokens, old CLI versions | ❌ never |

"`ent_` is _a_ data-API bearer credential" = what that token _can_ do. "The CLI never uses PATs" = the CLI sends the _other_ accepted bearer. No contradiction — but I should have said " _a_ credential the data API accepts" the first time. My bad.

## What this means for reinstating `auth list`

It collapses the case. Since the CLI **never** touches PATs for its own operation, reinstating `auth list`/`revoke` is **purely a management tool for PATs minted elsewhere** (dashboard / CI / legacy). It's not load-bearing _for the CLI_ in any sense — the CLI is fully functional, today, with PATs completely absent from its code.

So the real question isn't "do we need them" (we don't) — it's "do we want the CLI to be a place to _view and revoke_ PATs a user created elsewhere." That's a product call:

- **Yes** → reinstate as an honest `auth list`/`auth tokens` PAT surface (hygiene: revoke a leaked CI token from the terminal).
- **No** → leave it out; PAT lifecycle lives in the dashboard, CLI stays JWT-only. Given your "phase out PATs" goal and that the CLI doesn't use them, this is the more consistent path.

Which way do you want to go?

okay. that settles it. ensure you have completely ripped out the `auth list`, `auth tokens`, etc machinery that may manipulate PATs - as far as this cli repo is concerned, they're dead and gone and i never want to hear about them again. i hope that's clear, and ensure every trace of these ent\_XXX PATs is burned with fire.

1mo ago·6m·22 calls

Done — `f743eb58e5`. Clean tree.

## What got burned

- **`Provider.AuthTokensPath`** field + its `/api/v1/auth/tokens` values + tests — gone. Nothing in the repo references entire-web's PAT path anymore (verified: `/api/v1/auth/tokens` grep is empty).
- **PAT-era naming renamed to sessions**: `api/auth_tokens.go` → `api/sessions.go`, `WithAuthTokensPath` → `WithSessionsPath`, `authTokensPath` → `sessionsPath`, `errAuthTokensPathUnset` → `errSessionsPathUnset`.
- **PAT / `ent_` / personal-access-token prose** scrubbed from comments.

## Logout endpoint — confirmed correct

Traced and verified: every logout request goes to **entire-core** (`api.AuthBaseURL()`) at `/api/auth/tokens[/current|/{id}]` with the session-scoped core JWT. The only data-host (`api.BaseURL()`) reference left is the TLS guard, not a request target. **That 400 from entire-web's PAT endpoint cannot recur** — the path no longer exists in the CLI.

Build, fmt, lint (0 issues), and the `cli`/`api`/`auth` suites all pass. Eight commits now on `auth-context-consolidation`.

Two leftovers, your call:

- The earlier **COR-389 Linear comment** and the `auth-tokens-are-refresh-families` **memory** predate the `ent_`-PAT discovery — they describe entire-core's families but not the entire.io PAT distinction. Want me to correct them so the record isn't misleading?
- I did **not** run the full `mise run test:ci` (integration + canary) — say the word before you push and I'll run it.

You won't hear about `ent_` PATs from me again.

yes update the COR-389 Linear comment and the auth-tokens-are-refresh-families memory

1mo ago·2m·5 calls

Both updated.

- **Linear COR-389 comment** — added a prominent correction banner at the top and a full `⚠️ CORRECTION` section at the bottom: the original trace was entire-core's families, but the CLI was actually hitting entire.io's `/api/v1/auth/tokens` (`ent_` PATs, a separate surface being sunset). Documents the bug, the two-surface distinction, and what shipped (PATs burned, status local-only, logout → entire-core). The original text is preserved with the banner flagging that it's superseded.

- **Memory** — replaced the misleading `auth-tokens-are-refresh-families` with `auth-token-surfaces`, which captures both surfaces correctly, the key fact that the CLI never uses `ent_` PATs, the bug, and the resolution. Index (`MEMORY.md`) updated; old file deleted.

The record now reflects reality: **session management → entire-core auth host, always; entire.io's `ent_` PAT endpoint is sunset and the CLI never touches it.**

Branch `auth-context-consolidation` stands at 8 commits, clean tree, nothing pushed. Still on the table whenever you want it: running the full `mise run test:ci` before you push.

ok, cast your mind back to the beginning of our session. summarise our progress according to the goal of simplifying the UX of auth and logins.

1mo ago·39.5s

Bottom line: we materially simplified the auth command surface and fixed a real logout bug, but the headline COR-389 deliverable — **auto-refreshing JWTs on control-plane calls** — hasn't been touched yet. A lot of the work was discovery that corrected our mental model mid-flight.

## The original goal (start of session)

COR-389: consolidate the two auth views (`auth list` vs `auth contexts`), port API calls onto the context-aware path, and get **silent JWT refresh** on every control-plane call. Broadly: make auth/logins simpler.

## UX: before → after

|  | Before | After |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Commands | `login, logout, status, list, revoke, contexts, use` | `login, logout, status, contexts, use` |
| `auth list` | server table of "API tokens" | **gone** |
| `auth revoke` | revoke by id / `--current` | **gone** |
| `auth status` | "logged in" + token count | **profile** (name/@handle/email/provider via `/me`) \+ active context, local-only |
| `auth contexts` | tab-separated, no headers | **styled table** with headers + active marker |
| `logout` | revoke current (wrong endpoint, 400'd) | revokes session via **entire-core**; `--all` = all sessions on the core |

Net: two commands removed, the confusing/empty/erroring server calls gone, status now actually tells you _who_ you are, and the `ent_` PAT concept is fully eliminated from the CLI.

## What shipped (8 commits, branch `auth-context-consolidation`)

- Dropped `auth list` \+ `auth revoke`; folded session teardown into `logout`.
- `auth status` → local profile + context (`/me` for liveness/identity).
- Styled `auth contexts` table.
- `api.Token` → `api.Session` rename; removed dead `RemoveAllContexts`.
- **Critical fix**: session list/revoke was hitting entire.io's `ent_` PAT endpoint (→ empty lists, 400 on logout). Repointed to entire-core `/api/auth/tokens`; burned all PAT plumbing.
- Corrected the COR-389 Linear comment + memory to reflect the two-surface reality.

Worth flagging: there was real churn — I added an "active sessions" table, then removed it once we discovered it was listing PATs, not sessions. The course-corrections were the cost of the wrong initial model.

## What's NOT done

- **The actual COR-389 core: silent refresh.** Wiring `contextTokenStore` \+ `RefreshPath` into `defaultManager` so control-plane calls re-mint expired JWTs. Untouched. This was the primary ask.
- **Multi-core retargeting** — `auth status`/control-plane still target static `AuthBaseURL`, not the active context's core.
- **Verification** — none of this is exercised against your live local core, and I haven't run `mise run test:ci`. Nothing pushed.

So: auth UX is meaningfully simpler and a latent logout bug is fixed, but if the session's success criterion is "JWTs auto-refresh," we've cleared the prerequisites and haven't yet done the refresh wiring itself.

ok wat

\[paul@boulot\] ~/.claude/worktrees/cli/wiggly-marinating-origami
15:22:03 (git) auth-context-consolidation $ entire auth contexts
CONTEXT HANDLE CORE URL
eu.auth.partial.to toothbrush [https://eu.auth.partial.to](https://eu.auth.partial.to/)

- eu.auth.entire.io toothbrush [https://eu.auth.entire.io](https://eu.auth.entire.io/)
\[paul@boulot\] ~/.claude/worktrees/cli/wiggly-marinating-origami
15:22:07 (git) auth-context-consolidation $ entire auth status
validate token: fetch profile: decode response: default (code 401): unexpected Content-Type: text/plain

1mo ago·2m

Bottom line: `auth status` is hitting the wrong core. This is the multi-core targeting gap we deferred, now biting — plus a second bug where the resulting 401 prints raw instead of a friendly message.

## What's happening

Your active context is `eu.auth.entire.io`, but `auth status` calls `GET /me` against **`api.AuthBaseURL()`** — a _static_ host (`ENTIRE_AUTH_BASE_URL` or the `us.auth.entire.io` default), **not** your active context's core. So it's sending your `eu` session token to a different core, which 401s. Two distinct defects:

1. **Wrong target (the real bug):**`auth status` / `coreapi` ignore the active context and use the static `AuthBaseURL`. `auth use` switches the context but control-plane calls don't follow — exactly the "does the status URL come from the context?" gap I flagged earlier (answer was "no"). Your two-core setup is the case that breaks it.
2. **Ugly error (secondary):** that 401 comes back as `text/plain`, so the ogen client fails to decode it and surfaces `decode response: ... (code 401)`. My `isKeychainTokenRejected` only catches a _typed_`ErrorModelStatusCode` 401, so it misses this shape and falls through to the raw `validate token:` message instead of "token no longer valid — re-login."

## One thing to confirm

What does `ENTIRE_AUTH_BASE_URL` resolve to? Run:

```
! echo "${ENTIRE_AUTH_BASE_URL:-<unset → default us.auth.entire.io>}"
```

- If it's **not**`eu.auth.entire.io` → confirmed cross-core mismatch (#1 is the cause).
- If it **is**`eu.auth.entire.io` → then `/me` is genuinely 401'ing your token (expired/scope), and #2 (the friendly-message fix) is the main thing.

## Proposed fix

Either way I'll harden #2 (a 401 in any shape → friendly re-login message). The bigger fix for #1: make `auth status` resolve the **active context's `CoreURL` \+ its token** and call `/me` there (falling back to `AuthBaseURL` only when there's no active context). That makes `auth use` actually retarget status — and is a down payment on the COR-389 multi-core retargeting for the rest of the control plane.

Confirm the env value and I'll implement — I'd rather not guess the root cause a third time this session.

yep okay that was it. pity this PR is already so big, but yes, we should make `entire auth status` aware of contexts.json. let's use the current active context and hit up /me on that login server.

1mo ago·9m·24 calls

Done — `ae7d63c1ad`, clean tree.

## What this fixes

Your exact failure: `auth status` was querying `/me` on the static `AuthBaseURL`, so with `eu.auth.entire.io` active it sent that context's token to the wrong core → 401 → and the `text/plain` 401 body made ogen barf the raw `decode response: ...` dump.

- **`auth status` is now context-aware.**`resolveStatusTarget` picks the **active context's `CoreURL` \+ its session token**; `/me` hits that login server. `auth use` finally retargets status, and "Logged in to …" shows the active context's core. Falls back to `AuthBaseURL` \+ legacy entry only when no context is active.
- **`coreapi.NewWithBearer(coreURL, token)`** added — hits a specific core with a fixed bearer (no STS), which is what status needs.
- **The ugly error is gone:** a non-JSON 401 now maps to the friendly "Login for … is no longer valid → run entire login" message.
- TLS-guarded the resolved core URL before sending the token.

Tests: rewrote the status suite for the new shape, added `TestRunAuthStatus_QueriesActiveContextCore` (proves it hits the active core/token), `TestResolveStatusTarget_PrefersActiveContext`, and a table case pinning the exact `(code 401)` text/plain regression. All green; lint clean.

This is the multi-core retargeting — scoped to `auth status` — that we'd deferred. **Please re-run `entire auth status`** with `eu.auth.entire.io` active; you should now see your profile from `eu`'s `/me` instead of the 401.

Nine commits on `auth-context-consolidation`. Note the same static-`AuthBaseURL` issue still affects the _other_ control-plane commands (`org`/`repo`/`project`/`grant` via `coreapi.New()`) — out of scope here, part of the broader COR-389 retargeting. Want that captured as a task before you push?

I think this is an ok spot to stop. The PR is big enough. Create a draft PR for me, then write a small handover as to what we were trying to achieve and where we got to.

1mo ago·2m·4 calls

My 9 commits stack cleanly on `wiggly-marinating-origami`. PR **#1337** ("auth: silent login-token refresh", branch `auth-silent-token-refresh`) is the work we spun off from — let me confirm the spinoff point matches it so I set the PR base correctly for stacking:

i just merged the base branch, so we will need to rebase on origin/main

1mo ago·6m·8 calls

Draft PR up: **[https://github.com/entireio/cli/pull/1341](https://github.com/entireio/cli/pull/1341)** (base `main`, 9 commits).

* * *

## Handover

**Goal (COR-389 + your follow-ups):** consolidate the two auth views, get the CLI fully onto the context-aware/JWT model, and ultimately auto-refresh JWTs on every control-plane call. Broadly: make auth/login UX coherent.

**Where we got to — shipped in #1341:**

- Auth command surface trimmed from 7 → 5: dropped `auth list` \+ `auth revoke`.
- `auth status` is now context-aware: profile via `/me` on the **active context's** core, shows identity + active context. `auth use` finally retargets it.
- `auth contexts` → styled table. `logout` revokes server-side via **entire-core** (`--all` = all sessions on the core).
- **Burned all `ent_` PAT machinery** — the CLI never used PATs; that surface is being sunset.

**Key thing we learned (the expensive lesson):** there are two same-shaped "auth/tokens" surfaces — entire-core `/api/auth/tokens` (login sessions) vs entire.io `/api/v1/auth/tokens` (legacy `ent_` PATs). The CLI was wrongly hitting the PAT one for "sessions" → empty lists + logout 400s. Everything now targets entire-core. Full write-up in the **COR-389 Linear comment** (corrected) and memory `auth-token-surfaces`.

**What's NOT done (next session):**

1. **The actual COR-389 deliverable — silent JWT refresh** on control-plane calls (`contextTokenStore` \+ `RefreshPath` into `defaultManager`). Untouched. This is the real prize; everything so far was prerequisite + cleanup.
2. **Multi-core retargeting for the rest of the control plane** — `org`/`repo`/`project`/`grant` (via `coreapi.New()`) still use static `AuthBaseURL`. Only `auth status` was retargeted. Same bug pattern as the one we just fixed.

**Verification gaps:** Go lint clean, per-package tests green; full `mise run test:ci` (integration + canary) **not** run. None of it exercised against a live core — please sanity-check `entire auth status` / `logout` against your local `eu.auth.entire.io`.

PR is **draft** so CI can run; flip to ready when you've eyeballed it. Nothing else pushed.

[0f84383auth: drop \`auth list\`, show active sessions in \`auth status\`\\
\\
Remove the \`entire auth list\` command. The rows it listed are server-side\\
login sessions (OAuth refresh-token families), not personal access tokens —\\
nothing functional depends on listing them (see COR-389 notes). Fold that\\
view into \`entire auth status\` as a clearly-labelled "Active sessions" table,\\
reusing the table renderer.\\
\`auth revoke <id>\` still works; the session IDs now come from \`auth status\`.\\
\\
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 1774a9e75c37+74/-142](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/0f84383b67d73a0024e84c2b08bc827f50ab94b3/index.html)

[7c8e04aauth: remove \`auth revoke\`; redefine \`logout --all\` to revoke sessions\\
\\
Delete the \`entire auth revoke\` command. Session management collapses to\\
two verbs: \`auth status\` shows active sessions, \`logout\` ends them.\\
\\
Redefine the \`logout --all\` flag — it no longer removes all \*local\*\\
contexts. Instead:\\
\\
\- \`logout\` revokes the active session server-side (DELETE\\
.../tokens/current) and removes the active context\\
locally. (Unchanged default behaviour.)\\
\- \`logout --all\` additionally asks the server to revoke \*every\* session\\
on the active core (list families -> delete each by id).\\
The local side is identical to the default.\\
\\
After a logout clears the active context, the next saved context is\\
promoted to active, so running \`entire logout\` repeatedly drains every\\
saved login in turn.\\
\\
Cross-core revoke is out of scope: these endpoints target AuthBaseURL's\\
core only, pending the COR-389 control-plane retargeting.\\
\\
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 9dc3b1c4312c+126/-282](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/7c8e04a7c431fe4f0f23e05e2df4e303de5e2ec7/index.html)

[f78b7e2auth: styled table with headers for \`entire auth contexts\`\\
\\
Replace the tab-separated, headerless context listing with an aligned,\\
styled table (CONTEXT / HANDLE / CORE URL columns, "\*" marks the active\\
context), matching the \`auth status\` active-sessions table.\\
\\
Extract the column-sizing/writing loop into a shared renderAlignedTable\\
helper and rename the shared style set authTableStyles, since both auth\\
tables now use it.\\
\\
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 52bdb2ae5d4e+64/-20](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/f78b7e2f87536340de828abdf908a48af5f54c0a/index.html)

[9bca8fdauth: rename api.Token -> api.Session (and methods) to reflect reality\\
\\
These rows are OAuth refresh-token families (login sessions), not personal\\
access tokens — the CLI never mints them. Rename so the types are\\
self-documenting and drop the "Despite the api.Token name…" caveat:\\
\\
api.Token -> api.Session\\
api.TokensResponse -> api.SessionsResponse (wire key stays "tokens")\\
(\*Client).ListTokens -> ListSessions\\
(\*Client).RevokeToken -> RevokeSession\\
(\*Client).RevokeCurrentToken -> RevokeCurrentSession\\
\\
cli: authTokenLister -> sessionLister\\
defaultListTokens -> defaultListSessions\\
defaultRevokeCurrentToken -> defaultRevokeCurrentSession\\
newAPITokensClient -> newSessionsClient\\
\\
Pure rename: wire paths and JSON field names are unchanged, so the server\\
contract is untouched.\\
\\
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 0e17fccbbe86+94/-91](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/9bca8fd975ce51d0a9c52c3e02f80b6d71c16e1e/index.html)

[74c24b2auth: remove unused RemoveAllContexts\\
\\
Dead since \`logout --all\` was redefined to revoke server-side sessions\\
rather than nuke all local contexts. Nothing else references it.\\
\\
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 7dc263eaaac8-80](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/74c24b2a0d9a57ba9145437abc1d5fdfaf88b769/index.html)

[c2cea0aauth: show user profile in \`auth status\` via core GET /me\\
\`entire auth status\` now calls the core API's GET /me, which both validates\\
the stored token (liveness) and supplies a profile header:\\
\\
Logged in to https://us.auth.entire.io\\
User: Alice Smith (@alice) <alice@example.com>\\
Identity: github/alice\\
Token: stored in OS keychain\\
\\
Active sessions:\\
...\\
\\
/me is the primary liveness gate (a 401 surfaces as\\
\*coreapi.ErrorModelStatusCode, now recognised by isKeychainTokenRejected).\\
The active-sessions list runs after, on the data API; since the token is\\
already known good, a list failure degrades to a stderr warning instead of\\
failing the command. Empty profile fields are omitted.\\
\\
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 5ca10643dc53+195/-49](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/c2cea0a71dee3e54cd8563d3e3d0f148b5ed3cab/index.html)

[825b8e2auth: stop hitting entire.io PAT endpoint; sessions live on entire-core\\
\`auth status\` and \`logout\` were pointing session list/revoke at entire.io's\\
/api/v1/auth/tokens — which is the legacy \`ent\_\` personal-access-token\\
surface, not login sessions. For a JWT login that endpoint lists nothing\\
(no ent\_ PATs) and rejects DELETE /current with 400 ("revoke entire-core\\
JWTs via entire-core"). The CLI never mints or sends ent\_ PATs, so it has no\\
business there.\\
\\
Repoint session management at entire-core (the auth host) /api/auth/tokens,\\
authenticated with the session-scoped login JWT (resolveAuthHostToken — a\\
same-host resolution that preserves the entire:session scope core's session\\
routes require):\\
\- auth status: drop the server-side session table entirely. Status is now\\
local: GET /me (profile + liveness) + the active login context. No PAT\\
endpoint, no empty "active sessions".\\
\- logout: revoke the current session (and --all: every session on the core)\\
via entire-core, not entire.io.\\
\\
Removes the now-dead session-table rendering + date-formatting helpers.\\
\\
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 99a4950a334d+150/-495](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/825b8e2493c67f604298c9e05fb34efb975f68b8/index.html)

[f8390f9auth: burn all PAT machinery; sessions/logout target entire-core only\\
\\
entire.io's ent\_ personal-access-token surface (/api/v1/auth/tokens) is\\
being sunset, and the CLI never used it for auth — it authenticates with the\\
core JWT. Remove every trace from this repo:\\
\- Drop the dead Provider.AuthTokensPath field (and its /api/v1/auth/tokens\\
values + tests); nothing references the entire.io PAT path anymore.\\
\- Rename the api.Client session plumbing off PAT-era naming:\\
api/auth\_tokens.go -> api/sessions.go, WithAuthTokensPath -> WithSessionsPath,\\
authTokensPath -> sessionsPath, errAuthTokensPathUnset -> errSessionsPathUnset.\\
\- Scrub PAT / ent\_ / personal-access-token mentions from comments.\\
\\
Session management (auth status liveness via /me, logout revocation) targets\\
entire-core's /api/auth/tokens on the auth host (api.AuthBaseURL()) with the\\
session-scoped core JWT — never entire.io's PAT endpoint, so the 400 from\\
that endpoint cannot recur.\\
\\
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 5969a20f41e3+316/-340](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/f8390f909718f1675d97839cdb3e39a4772a21df/index.html)

[97207efauth: make \`auth status\` context-aware; hit /me on the active core\\
\`auth status\` queried /me against the static api.AuthBaseURL(), so with an\\
active context on a different core (e.g. \`auth use eu.auth.entire.io\` while\\
AuthBaseURL defaults to us.\*) it sent the context's token to the wrong core\\
and got a 401 — surfaced as a raw ogen decode dump because the 401 body was\\
text/plain.\\
\- Resolve the active contexts.json context first (resolveStatusTarget): use\\
its CoreURL + session token, falling back to AuthBaseURL + the legacy\\
keyring entry only when no context is active. \`auth use\` now retargets\\
status. "Logged in to <core>" reflects the active context.\\
\- Add coreapi.NewWithBearer(coreURL, token) to hit a specific login server\\
with a fixed bearer (no STS), used by status's /me.\\
\- Harden isKeychainTokenRejected: a non-JSON 401 (ogen "decode response:\\
... (code 401)") now maps to the friendly re-login hint, not a raw dump.\\
\- TLS-guard the resolved context core URL before sending the token.\\
\\
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 1385b003c7a8+205/-150](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/97207efe96ded98c95bbb6813678aea9c0d4ef08/index.html)

is this still a good thing to have done?

> api.Token → api.Session rename; added coreapi.NewWithBearer.

1mo ago·37.3s

Bottom line: yes, it survived the plot twist — the name is accurate _now_, and the type still earns its keep. But it's leaner-justified than when we did it.

- **`api.Session` is correct for the endpoint we now hit.** We renamed it believing entire.io's rows were sessions (they were PATs — wrong at the time). But the later repoint to **entire-core `/api/auth/tokens`** made the "session" framing genuinely true: that endpoint really does return login/refresh-token families. So we landed on the right name, partly by luck.
- **It's still used** — by `logout --all`: `ListSessions` → enumerate families → `RevokeSession(id)`. And `RevokeCurrentSession` for default logout. So `api.Session` / `SessionsResponse` / the three methods all have a live caller against entire-core. Not dead code.
- **`coreapi.NewWithBearer`** is actively used by `auth status` to hit `/me` on the active context's core — needed, keep.

Honest caveat: `auth status` no longer renders a session table, so of `api.Session`'s fields only `ID` is actually consumed now (by `--all`); `Scope/ExpiresAt/LastUsedAt/CreatedAt` are decoded-but-unused wire-shape mirror. Mild dead weight — could trim to `{ID}`, but it's harmless and matches the server contract, so not worth more churn in an already-big PR.

So: keep it. If anything, the only thing that _changed meaning_ under us was resolved in our favour — the rename that looked speculative mid-session is the right name for the entire-core endpoint we ended on.

let's add back the sessions table to `auth status`. then the `logout [--all]` thing will make more sense to the user too.

1mo ago·12m·23 calls

Done. Pushed and PR updated.

## What I added this round (commit `f9b8c3e707`)

- **`auth status` now shows the active sessions table** — `NAME / CREATED / LAST USED / EXPIRES` on the active context's core, after the profile/context lines, ending with: _"Run 'entire logout' to end this session, or 'entire logout --all' to end all of them."_ So the table directly explains what logout does. Listing failure is a soft note (liveness already confirmed via `/me`).
- **`logout` now targets the same core** the table lists — via the shared `resolveStatusTarget`, so `logout`/`--all` act on exactly the sessions you see, not a static `AuthBaseURL`. That closes the same multi-core mismatch for logout that we'd just fixed for status.
- `newSessionsClient` takes an explicit `coreURL`.

The table genuinely makes sense now precisely _because_ it's the real entire-core session list (the thing we spent the session untangling from the `ent_` PAT confusion).

Verified: build, fmt, lint (0 issues), and `cli`/`api`/`auth`/`coreapi` tests all green.

## State

- **PR #1341** (draft, `main`): now 10 commits, description updated to reflect the table + logout retargeting. [https://github.com/entireio/cli/pull/1341](https://github.com/entireio/cli/pull/1341)
- Pushed.

One small follow-up I flagged in the PR body rather than chase in an already-big PR: `resolveAuthHostToken` is now prod-unused (only its tests keep it alive) — a prune candidate. And the broader **silent-refresh** (COR-389 core) + retargeting `org`/`repo`/`grant` remain the next chunks.

Please give `entire auth status` and `entire logout` a spin against `eu.auth.entire.io` when you can — that's the real-world confirmation I couldn't do from here.

[f9b8c3eauth: show active sessions in \`auth status\`; logout targets same core\\
\\
Bring back the sessions table now that it correctly lists entire-core login\\
sessions (not entire.io PATs), so the effect of \`logout\` / \`logout --all\` is\\
visible:\\
\- \`auth status\` lists the active sessions (NAME / CREATED / LAST USED /\\
EXPIRES) on the active context's core, after the profile/context lines,\\
with a hint tying the table to \`logout\` and \`logout --all\`. Best-effort:\\
a listing failure is a soft note (liveness already confirmed via /me).\\
\- \`logout\` now revokes against the \*\*active context's core\*\* too (shared\\
resolveStatusTarget), so it acts on exactly the sessions status shows —\\
not a static AuthBaseURL. Fixes the same multi-core mismatch for logout.\\
\- newSessionsClient takes an explicit coreURL.\\
\\
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 8159eed97feb+196/-44](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/f9b8c3e707651dac9d44c8f67be907714cd2eb1b/index.html)

have a look at ~/src/entirehq/infra - you will want to add a cloudflare rule to the partial.to zero\_trust config so that this works without WARP:

16:16:09 (git) auth-context-co...▲ $ ENTIRE\_AUTH\_BASE\_URL= [https://eu.auth.partial.to](https://eu.auth.partial.to/) entire login
start login: start device auth: could not reach authentication server: server returned non-JSON response (check VPN, proxy, or firewall — e.g. Cloudflare WARP)

1mo ago·3m·8 calls

Done — that confirms it. `entire.io`'s auth host isn't behind CF Access at all (no bypasses needed → login just works). `partial.to` is the internal zone that gates `*.auth.partial.to` behind Access, so each non-browser OAuth/OIDC endpoint needs an explicit bypass. I extended the existing `auth_token_bypass` app exactly the way `/oauth/token` is already handled.

## Change (in `~/src/entirehq/infra`, working tree)

`cloudflare/partial.to/apps.tf` — added to the `auth_token_bypass` app's destinations:

```
{ type = "public", uri = "us.auth.partial.to/device_authorization" },
{ type = "public", uri = "eu.auth.partial.to/device_authorization" },
```

(\+ updated the app name and a comment explaining the RFC 8628 device-start leg.) `terraform fmt` clean.

## Why this fixes it

- `entire login` POSTs to `/device_authorization` to start the device flow — no browser, no Access creds → CF Access returned its HTML challenge → the CLI's JSON decode threw your exact error.
- The device-code **poll** (`/oauth/token`) and the back-channel exchange were already bypassed; only the **start** leg was missing. The browser approval page stays Access-gated (you're in a browser there, so it's fine).

## To take effect

It's a working-tree edit only — **not committed, not applied** (infra deploys are your call). Review + `terragrunt apply` in `cloudflare/partial.to/`, then `ENTIRE_AUTH_BASE_URL=https://eu.auth.partial.to entire login` should work WARP-free. Want me to commit it / open a PR in the infra repo, or leave it for you?

Note this is separate from the CLI PR #1341 — different repo, no code dependency.

make a PR.

1mo ago·3m·5 calls

Restored your branch — your checkout is back to `paul/mirror-sync-silence-eu-60m`, working tree clean. My commit is safe on **`paul/cf-device-auth-bypass`** (branched off `origin/main`, one commit, fmt-clean).

## Bottom line

Everything's done except the push, which is **blocked on partial.to auth** — and there's no GitHub remote to bypass it. The infra repo's `entire://` origin lives on `eukanuba.partial.to`, which needs a partial.to login, and right now there's no usable partial.to context active. It's the chicken-and-egg: pushing the fix for partial.to device-login needs a partial.to login.

## To get it pushed + PR'd

You have an `eu.auth.partial.to` context (from your earlier `auth contexts`). If its token is still valid:

```
entire auth use eu.auth.partial.to          # switch active context to partial.to
cd ~/src/entirehq/infra
git checkout paul/cf-device-auth-bypass
git push -u origin paul/cf-device-auth-bypass
```

Then tell me and I'll open the PR (`gh pr create -R entirehq/infra --base main`), or run it yourself.

**If that context's token is also expired** (so you can't push _or_`entire login` to partial.to), the clean escape hatch is to apply this change without the round-trip:

```
cd ~/src/entirehq/infra && git checkout paul/cf-device-auth-bypass
# review, then: cd cloudflare/partial.to && terragrunt apply
```

That deploys the `/device_authorization` bypass → `entire login` to partial.to starts working → then push the branch and open the PR normally.

Want me to draft the `gh pr create` body now so it's ready to fire the moment the branch lands on GitHub?

oh no 16:28:30.317 STDERR tofu: │ Error: failed to make http request
16:28:30.317 STDERR tofu: │
16:28:30.317 STDERR tofu: │ with cloudflare\_zero\_trust\_access\_application.auth\_token\_bypass,
16:28:30.317 STDERR tofu: │ on apps.tf line 438, in resource "cloudflare\_zero\_trust\_access\_application" "auth\_token\_bypass":
16:28:30.318 STDERR tofu: │ 438: resource "cloudflare\_zero\_trust\_access\_application" "auth\_token\_bypass" {
16:28:30.318 STDERR tofu: │
16:28:30.318 STDERR tofu: │ PUT
16:28:30.318 STDERR tofu: │ " [https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/8b04592ed74a5cce30d355b07276caf3/access/apps/265445ae-5c84-458f-8b76-cde4f79a73ea](https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/8b04592ed74a5cce30d355b07276caf3/access/apps/265445ae-5c84-458f-8b76-cde4f79a73ea)":
16:28:30.318 STDERR tofu: │ 400 Bad Request {
16:28:30.318 STDERR tofu: │ "result": null,
16:28:30.318 STDERR tofu: │ "success": false,
16:28:30.318 STDERR tofu: │ "errors": \[\
16:28:30.318 STDERR tofu: │ {\
16:28:30.318 STDERR tofu: │ "code": 12130,\
16:28:30.318 STDERR tofu: │ "message": "access.api.error.invalid\_request: too many destinations for one app"\
16:28:30.318 STDERR tofu: │ }\
16:28:30.318 STDERR tofu: │ \],
16:28:30.318 STDERR tofu: │ "messages": \[\]
16:28:30.318 STDERR tofu: │ }
16:28:30.318 STDERR tofu: │
16:28:30.318 STDERR tofu: ╵
16:28:30.335 ERROR tofu invocation failed in ./.terragrunt-cache/h5EGzoTtsXyYjk1psVhoDa\_oZQ8/bMp4I1wDG-u2A\_FQnt-0r0btW4w

1mo ago·2m·4 calls

Fixed. Root cause: Cloudflare caps destinations per Access app, and `auth_token_bypass` was already at the limit — 4 → 6 tripped "too many destinations" (code 12130). The `PUT` failed, so that app stayed at its old 4 destinations in Cloudflare and the device bypass never got created.

## Fix (committed `c6734568` on `paul/cf-device-auth-bypass`)

- `auth_token_bypass` restored to its original **4** destinations (no change from what's live → no diff to apply).
- New dedicated app **`auth_device_authorization_bypass`** with the two `{us,eu}.auth.partial.to/device_authorization` destinations + the same full-bypass policy. `terraform fmt` clean.

## Re-apply

```
cd ~/src/entirehq/infra && git checkout paul/cf-device-auth-bypass   # you're already here
cd cloudflare/partial.to && terragrunt apply
```

This time the plan just **creates** the new app (auth\_token\_bypass is untouched), so no cap to hit. After it applies, `ENTIRE_AUTH_BASE_URL=https://eu.auth.partial.to entire login` should work WARP-free.

## Then

Once that login works, the push unblocks:

```
git push -u origin paul/cf-device-auth-bypass
```

and I'll open the PR (`gh pr create -R entirehq/infra --base main`).

Note the branch now has two commits (the original + this split-fix); the net branch-vs-main diff is correct (4-dest `auth_token_bypass` \+ new device app). I didn't squash — that'd mean rewriting history, and a squash-merge will collapse it anyway. Holler if you'd rather I clean it up.

okay i just applied the Terraform, but still:

16:17:07 (git) auth-context-co...▲ $ ENTIRE\_AUTH\_BASE\_URL= [https://eu.auth.partial.to](https://eu.auth.partial.to/) entire login
start login: start device auth: could not reach authentication server: server returned non-JSON response (check VPN, proxy, or firewall — e.g. Cloudflare WARP)

1mo ago

[a0edbc1entire auth logout --everywhere\\
\\
Better name for the flag.\\
\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 0eb8618db00d+7/-7](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/a0edbc104d3c54cc1486539d84a6581858e787e0/index.html)

[b97efafauth: drop \`auth list\`, show active sessions in \`auth status\`\\
\\
Remove the \`entire auth list\` command. The rows it listed are server-side\\
login sessions (OAuth refresh-token families), not personal access tokens —\\
nothing functional depends on listing them (see COR-389 notes). Fold that\\
view into \`entire auth status\` as a clearly-labelled "Active sessions" table,\\
reusing the table renderer.\\
\`auth revoke <id>\` still works; the session IDs now come from \`auth status\`.\\
\\
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 1774a9e75c37+74/-142](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/b97efaf912edb24e34987c330b71b8c19e82899d/index.html)

[9ca4705auth: remove \`auth revoke\`; redefine \`logout --all\` to revoke sessions\\
\\
Delete the \`entire auth revoke\` command. Session management collapses to\\
two verbs: \`auth status\` shows active sessions, \`logout\` ends them.\\
\\
Redefine the \`logout --all\` flag — it no longer removes all \*local\*\\
contexts. Instead:\\
\\
\- \`logout\` revokes the active session server-side (DELETE\\
.../tokens/current) and removes the active context\\
locally. (Unchanged default behaviour.)\\
\- \`logout --all\` additionally asks the server to revoke \*every\* session\\
on the active core (list families -> delete each by id).\\
The local side is identical to the default.\\
\\
After a logout clears the active context, the next saved context is\\
promoted to active, so running \`entire logout\` repeatedly drains every\\
saved login in turn.\\
\\
Cross-core revoke is out of scope: these endpoints target AuthBaseURL's\\
core only, pending the COR-389 control-plane retargeting.\\
\\
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 9dc3b1c4312c+126/-282](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/9ca47056c1702d79122d7bac02f97ccae7a8fb79/index.html)

[f716ebfauth: styled table with headers for \`entire auth contexts\`\\
\\
Replace the tab-separated, headerless context listing with an aligned,\\
styled table (CONTEXT / HANDLE / CORE URL columns, "\*" marks the active\\
context), matching the \`auth status\` active-sessions table.\\
\\
Extract the column-sizing/writing loop into a shared renderAlignedTable\\
helper and rename the shared style set authTableStyles, since both auth\\
tables now use it.\\
\\
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 52bdb2ae5d4e+64/-20](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/f716ebfafb3261ddd5d8235274701881ee71d181/index.html)

[ed57e73auth: rename api.Token -> api.Session (and methods) to reflect reality\\
\\
These rows are OAuth refresh-token families (login sessions), not personal\\
access tokens — the CLI never mints them. Rename so the types are\\
self-documenting and drop the "Despite the api.Token name…" caveat:\\
\\
api.Token -> api.Session\\
api.TokensResponse -> api.SessionsResponse (wire key stays "tokens")\\
(\*Client).ListTokens -> ListSessions\\
(\*Client).RevokeToken -> RevokeSession\\
(\*Client).RevokeCurrentToken -> RevokeCurrentSession\\
\\
cli: authTokenLister -> sessionLister\\
defaultListTokens -> defaultListSessions\\
defaultRevokeCurrentToken -> defaultRevokeCurrentSession\\
newAPITokensClient -> newSessionsClient\\
\\
Pure rename: wire paths and JSON field names are unchanged, so the server\\
contract is untouched.\\
\\
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 0e17fccbbe86+94/-91](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/ed57e73ea92a5cd5068f04343eafebd26cd1baa7/index.html)

[d3427ddauth: remove unused RemoveAllContexts\\
\\
Dead since \`logout --all\` was redefined to revoke server-side sessions\\
rather than nuke all local contexts. Nothing else references it.\\
\\
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 7dc263eaaac8-80](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/d3427dda09066995d7e143df14d565cb4005ecad/index.html)

[3b28626auth: show user profile in \`auth status\` via core GET /me\\
\`entire auth status\` now calls the core API's GET /me, which both validates\\
the stored token (liveness) and supplies a profile header:\\
\\
Logged in to https://us.auth.entire.io\\
User: Alice Smith (@alice) <alice@example.com>\\
Identity: github/alice\\
Token: stored in OS keychain\\
\\
Active sessions:\\
...\\
\\
/me is the primary liveness gate (a 401 surfaces as\\
\*coreapi.ErrorModelStatusCode, now recognised by isKeychainTokenRejected).\\
The active-sessions list runs after, on the data API; since the token is\\
already known good, a list failure degrades to a stderr warning instead of\\
failing the command. Empty profile fields are omitted.\\
\\
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 5ca10643dc53+195/-49](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/3b286260df140b422b6b6689cca67e52306d95be/index.html)

[04e54e6auth: stop hitting entire.io PAT endpoint; sessions live on entire-core\\
\`auth status\` and \`logout\` were pointing session list/revoke at entire.io's\\
/api/v1/auth/tokens — which is the legacy \`ent\_\` personal-access-token\\
surface, not login sessions. For a JWT login that endpoint lists nothing\\
(no ent\_ PATs) and rejects DELETE /current with 400 ("revoke entire-core\\
JWTs via entire-core"). The CLI never mints or sends ent\_ PATs, so it has no\\
business there.\\
\\
Repoint session management at entire-core (the auth host) /api/auth/tokens,\\
authenticated with the session-scoped login JWT (resolveAuthHostToken — a\\
same-host resolution that preserves the entire:session scope core's session\\
routes require):\\
\- auth status: drop the server-side session table entirely. Status is now\\
local: GET /me (profile + liveness) + the active login context. No PAT\\
endpoint, no empty "active sessions".\\
\- logout: revoke the current session (and --all: every session on the core)\\
via entire-core, not entire.io.\\
\\
Removes the now-dead session-table rendering + date-formatting helpers.\\
\\
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 99a4950a334d+150/-495](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/04e54e606a9e878dcd61155a236afe7453e61cc6/index.html)

[c36b9bbauth: burn all PAT machinery; sessions/logout target entire-core only\\
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entire.io's ent\_ personal-access-token surface (/api/v1/auth/tokens) is\\
being sunset, and the CLI never used it for auth — it authenticates with the\\
core JWT. Remove every trace from this repo:\\
\- Drop the dead Provider.AuthTokensPath field (and its /api/v1/auth/tokens\\
values + tests); nothing references the entire.io PAT path anymore.\\
\- Rename the api.Client session plumbing off PAT-era naming:\\
api/auth\_tokens.go -> api/sessions.go, WithAuthTokensPath -> WithSessionsPath,\\
authTokensPath -> sessionsPath, errAuthTokensPathUnset -> errSessionsPathUnset.\\
\- Scrub PAT / ent\_ / personal-access-token mentions from comments.\\
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Session management (auth status liveness via /me, logout revocation) targets\\
entire-core's /api/auth/tokens on the auth host (api.AuthBaseURL()) with the\\
session-scoped core JWT — never entire.io's PAT endpoint, so the 400 from\\
that endpoint cannot recur.\\
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 5969a20f41e3+316/-340](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/c36b9bbf75f7165c62a89da7dea0b62cae550691/index.html)

[721ad68auth: make \`auth status\` context-aware; hit /me on the active core\\
\`auth status\` queried /me against the static api.AuthBaseURL(), so with an\\
active context on a different core (e.g. \`auth use eu.auth.entire.io\` while\\
AuthBaseURL defaults to us.\*) it sent the context's token to the wrong core\\
and got a 401 — surfaced as a raw ogen decode dump because the 401 body was\\
text/plain.\\
\- Resolve the active contexts.json context first (resolveStatusTarget): use\\
its CoreURL + session token, falling back to AuthBaseURL + the legacy\\
keyring entry only when no context is active. \`auth use\` now retargets\\
status. "Logged in to <core>" reflects the active context.\\
\- Add coreapi.NewWithBearer(coreURL, token) to hit a specific login server\\
with a fixed bearer (no STS), used by status's /me.\\
\- Harden isKeychainTokenRejected: a non-JSON 401 (ogen "decode response:\\
... (code 401)") now maps to the friendly re-login hint, not a raw dump.\\
\- TLS-guard the resolved context core URL before sending the token.\\
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 1385b003c7a8+205/-150](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/721ad68c16bcfa28cb128b1f194de29f2619a03c/index.html)

[35830c7auth: show active sessions in \`auth status\`; logout targets same core\\
\\
Bring back the sessions table now that it correctly lists entire-core login\\
sessions (not entire.io PATs), so the effect of \`logout\` / \`logout --all\` is\\
visible:\\
\- \`auth status\` lists the active sessions (NAME / CREATED / LAST USED /\\
EXPIRES) on the active context's core, after the profile/context lines,\\
with a hint tying the table to \`logout\` and \`logout --all\`. Best-effort:\\
a listing failure is a soft note (liveness already confirmed via /me).\\
\- \`logout\` now revokes against the \*\*active context's core\*\* too (shared\\
resolveStatusTarget), so it acts on exactly the sessions status shows —\\
not a static AuthBaseURL. Fixes the same multi-core mismatch for logout.\\
\- newSessionsClient takes an explicit coreURL.\\
\\
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>\\
Entire-Checkpoint: 8159eed97feb+196/-44](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/35830c7986d46baabf00a3439f9ca5cb85c4a3c9/index.html)

[b49905fentire auth logout --everywhere\\
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Better name for the flag.\\
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Entire-Checkpoint: 0eb8618db00d+7/-7](/content/gh/entireio/cli/commit/b49905f22cd914f061ccd5a284b59eee5d8bc1e0/index.html)